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Abstract
We construct a measure of global liquidity using the growth rates of
broad money for the G7 economies. Global liquidity produces forecasts of
US inflation that are significantly more accurate than the forecasts based
on US money growth, Phillips curve, autoregressive and moving average
models. The marginal predictive power of global liquidity is strong at three
years horizons. Results are robust to alternative measures of inflation.
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1 Introduction
Accurate inflation forecasts are essential for successful monetary policy making.
Effective predictors are essential for producing accurate forecasts. In the recent
past, characterized by low and stable inflation, researchers in academia and policy
institutions have had difficulty to find a reliable predictor for inflation. As Stock
and Watson (2006) emphasize, inflation has become so hard to forecast that it is
difficult to improve upon the projections of a naive random walk.
A long standing literature in macroeconomics has documented the long-run
relationship between money growth and inflation (see for instance Friedman and
Schwartz, 1982; Lucas, 1980; McCandless and Weber, 1995; Benati, 2007). It
does not come as surprise, then, that central banks monitor monetary aggregates
in an effort to predict movements in inflation. The European Central Bank goes
as far as regarding the stabilization of the growth of a broad monetary aggregate
as the first pillar of its monetary policy strategy.
The information content of monetary indicators for inflation, however, has
been recently called into question as a few studies, including Gal´ı et al.(2004)
and Gerlach and Svensson (2003), argue that domestic money growth has little
predictive power for domestic inflation.
A growing empirical literature exemplified by Rogoff (2003) has shown that
national inflation rates in several industrialized economies share a significant in-
ternational common component. To the extent that money growth and inflation
are highly correlated in the long-run, significant international comovements in
inflation may reflect significant international comovements in liquidity, which can
then be used to forecast domestic inflation.
In this work, we investigate whether global liquidity has marginal predictive
power for US inflation. We find that global liquidity, measured as either the
mean or the first dynamic principal component of the growth rates of broad
money across the G7 economies, produces inflation forecasts that are signifi-
cantly more accurate than the forecasts based on traditional models such as an
autoregressive specification, a Phillips curve relationship and a model based on
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US money growth. The predictive advantage is particularly pronounced at three
years horizon. Results are robust to alternative measures of inflation.
The forecasting models and the measure of global liquidity are presented in
Section 2. Section 3 reports the main results. Section 4 provides a robustness
analysis and a discussion of some alternative forecasting equations proposed in
recent contributions.
2 Forecasting models: old and new
There are several channels through which global liquidity may have an impact
on future domestic inflation. Over the last twenty years, inflation dynamics have
become more synchronised: different countries have shared similar experiences
with inflation becoming low and stable by the beginning of the 1990s.
Rogoff (2003) argues that improved monetary policies across the world has
been one of the most significant driver of the great moderation. Along simi-
lar lines, Barsky and Kilian (2001) offers a monetary explanation of the great
stagflation showing that a measure of world liquidity was highly correlated with
US monetary policy and inflation during the 1970s.
Another channel of transmission from global liquidity to domestic inflation
operates through the terms of trade. If the exchange rate does not fully outweigh
a rise in the import prices of intermediate and final goods, then domestic firms
will face higher costs and consumers will demand higher wages as result of the
deterioration of their purchasing power. By the same token, an inflow of capital
from abroad that is not followed by a sufficient appreciation of the exchange rate
can influence the evolution of domestic prices.
The goal of this note is to identify a new stylized fact linking global liquidity
to future movements in domestic prices, rather than to quantify the relative
contributions of the different transmission mechanisms. To this end, we assess the
marginal predictive power of global and domestic money growth for US inflation.
We consider three measures of inflation and for each measure, we forecast the
h-quarter annualized change of the price index, piht+h = [log(Pt+h)− log(Pt)]×
400
h
using three different specifications:
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1. Univariate autoregressive forecasts (AR), where the forecasts of inflation
are based exclusively on lags of the first difference of the price index.
piht+h|t = α1 + β1(L)pit + ε1,t+h (2.1)
2. Money growth forecasts in which the AR specification is augmented with a
measure of US broad money growth.
piht+h|t = α2 + β2(L)pit + γ2(L)M
US
t + ε2,t+h (2.2)
3. Global liquidity forecasts in which the AR specification is augmented with
a measure of broad money growth in the G7 economies.
piht+h|t = α3 + β3(L)pit + γ3(L)M
Global
t + ε3,t+h (2.3)
The first two specifications are standard and they have been extensively used
in the literature (see for example Nicoletti-Altimari, 2001, for an application to
the Euro Area). The third specification, in contrast, is new.1 In the baseline
case, global liquidity is defined as the simple mean of the growth rates of broad
money in the G7 economies.
As definitions vary across countries, we select the monetary aggregates that
are most similar in terms of composition: M4 for the U.K., M3 for Italy and
France, and M2 for all other countries. Inflation is measured as the log difference
of the Consumer Price Index (CPI ), Personal Consumption Expenditure Deflator
(PCED) and GDP deflator (GDPD).
In each countries, the figures on monetary aggregates are typically released be-
tween the first and the third week of the following month. The latest observation
on US prices is rarely available by the first half of the following month.
The series of global liquidity is shown in Figure 1 as blue, bold line together
with the three series of US inflation. The top left and right, and the bottom left
and right panels correspond to the 1st, 4th, 8th and 12th log differences of the price
level and thus they refer to one quarter, and one, two and three years inflation.
1We refer to the second and third specifications as ‘unrestricted’ or ‘augmented AR’.
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Figure 1: Global liquidity and inflation at different frequencies
Interestingly, the peaks and troughs in global liquidity always precede the peaks
and troughs in US inflation. This pattern is more pronounced for the 8th and 12th
differences in the bottom panels, suggesting that the correlation between global
liquidity and US inflation may be stronger at low frequencies.
The correlations in Figure 1 are, of course, only suggestive, and a formal
analysis requires defining a metric for forecasting comparison. We perform a
pseudo out-of-sample forecasting exercise for each variable and model over the
horizons h = 1, 4, 6, 8, 10, and 12 quarters. The estimation sample begins in the
first quarter of 1980 and it ends in the fourth quarter of 1989. The pseudo out-
of-sample forecasting period begins in the first quarter of 1990 and it ends in the
second quarter of 2006.
Forecasts constructed at date t + h are based on models that are estimated
using observations dated t and earlier. We focus on recursive samples, though
results are robust to using rolling samples. The Mean Square Forecast Error
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(MSFE) is the metric for evaluating the forecast accuracy:
MSFEt1t0 (i, h,m) =
1
t1 − t0 + 1
t1∑
t=t0
(
pˆihi,t+h|t(m)− pi
h
t+h
)2
where 1990 : 1 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 < 2006 : 2 − h. This is the average squared error
between time t0 and t1, for variable i, at horizon h, using model m.
3 Results
In this section, we assess the predictive accuracy of the three models (2.1)-(2.3).
Results are reported for three alternative measure of inflation based on CPI,
PCED and GDPD.
The restricted AR model is used as benchmark and therefore its MSFEs, in
italics, are expressed in absolute terms. The findings for the other specifications
are presented as the MSFE of that specification relative to the MSFE of the AR
model. The number of lags is selected using the Schwartz information criterion.2
Asterisks denote rejection of the null hypothesis that the MSFE of the AR model
is equal to the MSFE of the unrestricted models.3
A number of interesting results emerge from Table 1. US money growth has
no information content for future US inflation as the relative MSFEs in the second
row of each panel are above one, with the only (insignificant) exception of CPI
at 4 quarter horizon. Global liquidity, in contrast, has strong marginal predictive
power for inflation, producing forecasts that are significantly more accurate than
the forecasts of the autoregressive model for all horizons beyond one year. The
improvements in forecast ability over 10 and 12 quarter horizons are, on average,
in the order of 54%.
The last row of the panels in Table 1 shows the findings for an alternative
measure of global liquidity based on the first dynamic principal component (pc).4
2Candidate predictors enter benchmark and augmented specifications with the first lag.
Three lags are used for CPI, and four lags for PCE and GDPD inflation. Results are robust to
using the Akaike information criterion.
3The test is based on the MSFE-F statistics proposed by Clark and McCracken (2005). As in
nested models the statistics has a non-standard asymptotic distribution, we compute empirical
critical values using 5000 bootstrap repetitions as suggested by Clark and McCracken (2005).
4In an exact factor model, the estimates of the common factor based on maximum likelihood
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Table 1: Relative MSFEs - 1990Q1:2006Q2
Horizon 1 4 6 8 10 12
Consumer price index
Autoregressive 2.38 0.95 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.84
US money growth 1.04 0.97 1.07 1.12 1.15 1.29
Global liquidity 1.13 0.95∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.44∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗
Global liquidity pc 1.00 1.06 0.84∗∗ 0.71∗∗ 0.64∗∗ 0.58∗∗
Personal consumption expenditure
Autoregressive 0.91 0.64 0.65 0.74 0.84 0.98
US money growth 1.01 1.02 1.11 1.13 1.12 1.18
Global liquidity 0.94∗ 0.69∗∗∗ 0.60∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗ 0.47∗∗∗
Global liquidity pc 0.95∗∗ 0.77∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
GDP Deflator
Autoregressive 0.53 0.30 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54
US money growth 1.16 1.47 1.38 1.44 1.41 1.47
Global liquidity 0.93∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.55∗∗∗ 0.50∗∗ 0.52∗∗∗
Global liquidity pc 0.85∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗ 0.74∗∗∗ 0.66∗∗∗ 0.56∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
Notes: The autoregressive model is the benchmark and its MSFEs, in italics, are reported
in absolute terms. The other entries refer to the MSFEs of that specification relative to the
MSFEs of the benchmark. Asterisks denote that the MSFEs of the unrestricted model are
statistically different and (more accurate) than the MSFEs of the the benchmark (restricted)
model at 1% (∗ ∗ ∗), 5% (∗∗) and 10% (∗) significance levels.
The marginal predictive power of the alternative measure is less pronounced than
the predictive power of the simple mean. The principal component, however,
produces improvements in forecast ability beyond two years which are still, on
average, in the order of 47%. Results hold true for all measures of inflation, and
are robust to using the estimation sample 1985:1-1994:4.
are more accurate than the estimates based on principal components. To the extent that a
small group of countries within the G7 may share a regional common factor, due for instance to
business cycle synchronization or a regional monetary system, the idiosyncratic components are
likely correlated. In an approximate factor structure with one common factor, Doz, Giannone
and Reichlin (2006) show that maximum likelihood and the two-step procedure used in this
paper perform similarly, even for cross-section dimensions as small as five. In our panel, the
correlation between the common factors extracted with the two methods is 0.96.
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4 Robustness analysis and discussion
In this section, we discuss the robustness of our findings to the international
composition of our measure of global liquidity, the inclusion of global inflation
and the nominal exchange rate as additional predictors, a different transformation
of the price indexes, alternative forecasting models and sample selection. We also
discuss the evidence for the other G7 countries.
Global comovements
To the extent that global liquidity captures an authentic international comove-
ment, our results should not hinge upon the forecasting performance of broad
money growth in a specific country. We investigate this hypothesis by computing
the relative MSFEs of seven alternative specifications in which the AR model is
augmented with a measure of international liquidity that excludes, in turn, the
money growth of one of the G7 economies.
The measures of global liquidity based on the seven panels of six countries
retain the forecasting advantage of the baseline measure, and therefore they reveal
that the marginal predictive power of global liquidity for US inflation comes from
a genuine global component.
The forecasts based on global liquidity are significantly more accurate than
the forecasts based on a measure of global inflation. Global inflation is con-
structed as the simple mean of inflation rates across countries. Augmenting the
model of global liquidity with the log difference of the trade-weighted nominal
exchange does not overturn our conclusions and, in a few occasions, it improves
the predictive accuracy of the unrestricted model.
An alternative transformation of the price index
In his Nobel lecture, Lucas (1995) emphasizes that a central prediction of
the quantitative theory of money is that the relationship between inflation and
money growth holds in the long-run. Recent international evidence by Benati
(2007) shows that the slow-moving component of money growth leads the slow-
moving component of inflation. Theory and evidence thus suggest that money
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growth is useful to forecast the change in the price level, and the change in the
price level has been indeed the focus of our analysis.
When the focus is on short-run movements, however, the econometrician may
find it more convenient to forecast the change in inflation, piht+h−pit, with h repre-
senting the forecast horizon (see for instance Stock and Watson, 2006). Together
with the results of the previous section, Figure 1 suggests that global liquidity
and US inflation are significantly correlated only at low frequencies.
Relative MSFEs, not reported but available upon request, reveal that neither
domestic nor global liquidity have marginal predictive power for the change in
inflation. The latter finding, however, is not surprising as the transformation
piht+h − pit removes the low frequency component of inflation, and therefore the
predictive ability of money growth.5
Two popular models of inflation
The Phillips curve is one of the corner stone of modern macroeconomic theory.
The in-sample evidence on the existence of a robust correlation between inflation
and real activity has led several authors to conjecture the existence of a Phillips
curve relationship also out-of-sample. Inflation can be then forecasted as:
piht+h|t = α4 + β4(L)pit + γ4(L)ut + ε4,t+h (4.4)
where ut represents the growth rate of unemployment.
A more agnostic view on the inflation process has been discussed by Stock and
Watson (2006), who shows that the IMA(1,1) provides a reasonable description
of US inflation. According to the IMA(1,1), inflation evolves as:
pit − pit−1 = (1− θL) at (4.5)
where θ is positive and at is serially uncorrelated with zero mean. We employ
the letter θ to emphasize that the IMA(1,1) does not nest the benchmark model
5Along similar lines, Watson (2004) argues that the change in inflation cannot be used to
establish the existence of a Phillips curve relationship out of sample, because the transformation
pih
t+h
− pit removes, by construction, the business cycle frequency component of inflation that
the Phillips curve is meant to capture.
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(2.1). For the IMA(1,1), and only for the IMA(1,1), we will perform the test of
equal predictive accuracy proposed by Diebold and Mariano (1995).
Table 2: Relative MSFEs - 1990Q1:2006Q2 - alternative models
Horizon 1 4 6 8 10 12
Consumer price index
Autoregressive 2.38 0.95 0.85 0.87 0.85 0.84
Phillips curve 1.13 1.04 1.01 1.03 1.04 1.02
IMA(1,1) 1.06 1.19oo 1.26ooo 1.26ooo 1.29ooo 1.31ooo
Personal consumption expenditure
Autoregressive 0.91 0.64 0.65 0.74 0.84 0.98
Phillips curve 1.01 0.96∗ 1.03 1.06 1.10 1.09
IMA(1,1) 0.91 0.93oo 0.92oo 0.88oo 0.84oo 0.76oo
GDP Deflator
Autoregressive 0.53 0.30 0.37 0.43 0.49 0.54
Phillips curve 1.12 0.98 1.06 1.12 1.15 1.13
IMA(1,1) 1.19 1.09o 1.06o 1.02o 1.00 0.92
Notes: see Table1. Circles denote rejection of the hypothesis of equal predictive accuracy
relative to the autoregressive model at 1% (ooo), 5% (oo) and 10% (o) significance levels.
In Table 2, we present the results from the models (4.4) and (4.5), together
with those from the autoregressive specification. The relative MSFEs based on
the Phillips curve are above one with the exception of the 4 quarter horizon
for PCED and GDPD. As for the IMA(1,1), the relative MSFEs are uniformly
above one for CPI and GDPD, but below one for PCED. In the latter case,
however, the performance of the forecasts based on the IMA(1,1) seems far from
the performance of the forecasts in Table 1 based on global liquidity.
Sample selection
Does the marginal predictive content of global liquidity for US inflation extend
to the 1970s? In their accounting of the great inflation, Barsky and Kilian (2001)
argue that “despite its origins in the U.S., the monetary expansion in the early
1970s was amplified by the workings of the international monetary system”, and
note that the increases in world liquidity were followed by increases in both world
and US inflation.
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The pre- and post-1984 periods have been associated with different degrees of
macroeconomic stability as well as different degrees of integration in goods and
capital markets. To the extent that terms of trade and capital flows are important
channels in the transmission of international shocks, global liquidity should have
a more limited impact on domestic inflation over the pre-1984 period.
Table 3: Relative MSFEs - 1970Q1:1984Q4
Horizon 1 4 6 8 10 12
Consumer price index
Autoregressive 6.73 7.40 8.73 9.49 9.27 8.63
US money growth 1.02 1.07 1.04 0.95 0.89∗ 0.85∗∗
Global liquidity 1.02 0.98 0.92∗ 0.86∗∗ 0.84∗∗ 0.87∗
Global liquidity pc 1.03 1.02 0.96 0.87∗ 0.82∗∗ 0.85∗
Personal consumption expenditure
Autoregressive 2.38 4.10 4.80 5.09 5.01 4.75
US money growth 1.04 1.07 1.03 0.98 0.90∗ 0.89∗
Global liquidity 1.04 0.99 0.97 0.91∗ 0.85∗∗ 0.88∗
Global liquidity pc 1.05 1.04 1.00 0.93∗ 0.84∗ 0.87∗
GDP Deflator
Autoregressive 2.92 3.90 4.23 4.13 4.02 3.52
US money growth 1.11 1.21 1.09 1.00 0.98 1.03
Global liquidity 1.05 1.09 0.92 0.70∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗ 0.74∗∗
Global liquidity pc 1.05 1.21 1.04 0.86∗ 0.74∗∗ 0.81∗
Notes: see Table 1
Tables 3 reports results for the estimation sample beginning in 1963Q2, when
data on broad money growth become available for at least five of the G7 coun-
tries.6 Liquidity helps to forecast inflation at horizons beyond two years, con-
sistently with the notion of a long-run relationship between money growth and
inflation. The panel for GDP deflator reveals that global liquidity has strong
marginal predictive power over and above US money growth. As for the other
measures of inflation, the forecasts based on domestic and global liquidity seem
equally accurate at 10 and 12 quarter horizons, whereas at 8 quarter horizon the
forecasts based on global liquidity are significantly more accurate.
6For Italy and France, data on broad money growth are available since 1980Q1 only.
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International Evidence
While an international comparison is beyond the scope of this work, we wish
to assess whether the results for the U.S. are the rule or the exception within
the G7 economies. For the other countries, we find that global liquidity has
predictive power for domestic inflation only when also domestic liquidity has
predictive power.
To the extent that favourable terms of trade, capital inflows and exchange rate
dynamics may account for some of the forecasting performance of global liquidity,
the US transmission mechanism of international shocks appears different from
those of the other G7 economies.
5 Conclusions
We have proposed a new predictor for US inflation: global liquidity. The forecasts
based on global liquidity are significantly more accurate than those based on US
money growth, Phillips curve, autoregressive and moving average models. Results
are particularly strong at horizons beyond two years.
The implication of our finding is that money growth still contains useful infor-
mation to predict future movements in domestic inflation rates. The information
content of money, however, is no longer reflected in domestic aggregates; rather
it is embodied in measures of global liquidity.
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